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POLICING CAREER CRIMINALS: AN
EXAMINATION OF AN INNOVATIVE
CRIME CONTROL PROGRAM*
Susan E. Martin**
A variety of criminal justice agencies have recently initiated ef-
forts to focus resources selectively on the most active and dangerous
offenders in response to resource limitations and research findings.
Few police departments, however, attempt to proactively identify
such offenders, devote extra resources to apprehending these of-
fenders or build better cases against them to increase the rate at
which they are convicted and incarcerated. In March, 1982, the
Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C. created the
Repeat Offender Project (ROP) to achieve these goals.
This paper reports findings from an evaluation of ROP's selec-
tive apprehension approach. The evaluation involved three sepa-
rate components: a field experiment to determine whether ROP
increased the likelihood of arrest for targeted repeat offenders; in-
tensive observation and informal interviews with ROP officers over
an eight month period to determine how the unit operated; and a
quasi-experiment. The quasi-experimental design, which is dis-
cussed in this article, compared ROP officers to (a) their perform-
ance prior to assignment to ROP and (b) a sample of officers in
other assignments to address the following questions:
1. How did assignment to ROP affect the officers' arrest
productivity?
2. Did the offenders that were arrested by ROP have longer and
more serious criminal histories?
3. Were ROP officers' arrestees more likely to be prosecuted, con-
victed and incarcerated than offenders arrested under routine police
operations?
* This research was supported in part by Grant No. 82-UJ-CX-0063 of the National
Institute ofJustice. The contents do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of this
grantor agency. I am grateful to Doug Smith for carrying out the multivariate analysis
and to Larry Sherman for helpful comments and suggestions.
** Project Director, Police Foundation. Ph.D., American University, 1977; M.S., Uni-





Since the publication of research findings indicating that a small
proportion of criminals commits a disproportionate amount of
crime, 1 a variety of criminal justice efforts have been initiated to se-
lectively identify and incapacitate 2 persons who are "career
criminals." To date, most of these efforts have been undertaken by
prosecutors and parole boards. But the police, as gatekeepers of
the criminal justice system, may also fruitfully adopt policies focused
on such offenders.
Traditionally the police have been mobilized to enforce the law
reactively, i.e., in response to a citizen's complaint.3 Proactive (i.e.,
police initiated) policing efforts have been limited to investigations
of vice and other "invisible offenses" for which there are no com-
plainants.4 The recent successes of Abscam, "stings," and efforts to
control police and political corruption, however, have contributed
to a growing interest in the use of proactive policing tactics to re-
duce street crime and deal with "career criminals."
Reactive and proactive policing involve officers in somewhat
different tasks and require distinct tactics. In reacting to citizens'
complaints, the officer's primary objective is to detect the occur-
rence of a crime and to identify and arrest the perpetrator either at
the scene of the crime or through subsequent investigation. In
proactive policing, the officer must observe or even facilitate a
crime.
5
1 See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
(1972); J. PETERSILIA, P. GREENWOOD & M. LAVIN, CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL
FELONS (1977); J. WILLIAMS, L. REDLINGER & P. MANNING, POLICE NARCOTICS CONTROL:
PATrERNS & STRATEGIES (1979); J. CHAIKEN, M. CHAIKEN &J.P. PETERSON, VARIETIES OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1982); P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION
(1982).
2 Incapacitation is the effect of isolating an identified offender from the larger soci-
ety (usually by imprisonment), thereby preventing him or her from committing crimes in
society. It is regarded as one of the principles that traditionally has guided sentencing
policy.
3 See A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971); Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2J.
OF LEGAL STUD. 125 (1973).
4 See J. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS (1978); Moore, Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to
Minimally Intrusive Law Enforcement, in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES & DECEPTION IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT (G. Caplan ed. 1983); POLICE NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 1.
5 See J. WILSON, supra note 4, at 48; P. MANNING, THE NARCS' GAME: ORGANIZA-
TIONAL AND INFORMAL LIMITS ON DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT (1980); Moore supra note 4, at
27. Moore, for example, notes that police are sometimes involved in instigating (as op-
posed to merely observing) criminal offenses. Id. The difference between instigation
and passive observation is that in the former the government agent plays a role in en-
couraging the occurence of the offense. Id. passim. This may lead to legal problems be-
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Programs focused on career criminals may use various combi-
nations of reactive and proactive tactics. To date, the reactive tac-
tics used in such programs have included the prioritized service of
warrants against identified "career criminals," 6 notification of the
prosecutor when an identified career criminal is arrested, and more
active supplementation of cases against such persons.7 Proactive
tactics have included the use of decoys, surveillance, suspicion
stops, and phony fencing operations.
Although many police administrators have expressed interest in
career criminal programs, few police departments have adopted
them. A recent survey found only thirty-three such programs in op-
eration nationwide, most of which involved reactive case supple-
mentation strategies, often in conjunction with prosecutors' units. 8
The few studies of the operation and effectiveness of career criminal
programs suggest that their limited success has been due, in large
part, to problems in program implementation. 9 Thus, Washing-
ton's Repeat Offender Project had to address both conceptual and
operational issues in developing a viable offender-oriented
program.
ROP'S DESIGN AND OPERATION
In March, 1982 the Metropolitan Police Department created the
Repeat Offender Project "to identify, arrest, and successfully prose-
cause the line between facilitation and entrapment is often unclear. Nevertheless, much
proactive policing depends on undercover police making themselves available and ap-
pearing to participate in illegal activities, such as purchasing stolen or contraband
goods.
6 See W. GAY, T. BEALL & R. BOWERS, A MuLTIsrrE ASSESSMENT OF THE INTEGRATED
CRIMINAL APPREHENSION PROGRAM: A FINAL REPORT (1984).
7 See New York City Police Department Felony Augmentation Program (1981) [hereinafter
Felony Augmentation Program]; Gay & Bowers, Targeting Law Enforcement Resources: The Ca-
reer Criminal, Focus Sept. 1985.
8 Gay & Bowers, supra note 7, at 9.
9 Programs that were evaluated included those in Kansas City, Manhattan, Birming-
ham, and a variety of the ICAP sites. See A. PATE, R. BOWERS & R. PARKS, THREE AP-
PROACHES TO CRIMINAL APPREHENSION IN KANSAS CITY: AN EVALUATION REPORT (1976);
Felony Augmentation Program, supra note 7; M. Wycoff, C. Brown & R. Peterson, Birming-
ham Anti-Robbery Unit Evaluation Report (1980)(unpublished report); W. GAY, T. BE-
ALL & R. BOWERS, supra note 6. These reports observed a variety of problems. For
example, surveillance operations were initiated without adequate information about sus-
pects who often could not be located. Surveillance lasted so long that targets became
"tail conscious." Blending into the ghetto environment was difficult because almost all
of the officers were young, white males who were required to remain cleanshaven and
drove cars that were easily identified as police cruisers. In addition, interunit rivalry
reduced information sharing, target selection procedures relied too heavily on criminal
record information, and coordination with prosecutors was inadequate.
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cute recidivists"' 10 using a variety of vice, surveillence, investigative
and intelligence tactics. Due to ROP's size and cost, the department
agreed to an external evaluation of ROP's activities and its
effectiveness.
At the time the study was initiated in January, 1983, ROP con-
sisted of sixty officers commanded by a captain and three lieuten-
ants. The officers were organized into eight squads of four to six
officers, a detective, and a sergeant. The squad was the basic work
unit to which targets were assigned and arrests credited. In addi-
tion, a target committee composed of five experienced investigators
was responsible for developing new targets, reviewing candidates
generated by the squads, and maintaining ROP's records.
In creating the unit, ROP's commanders selected officers who
varied in age, race, sex, appearance and prior police experience."
They acquired twenty old cars that blended inconspicuously into in-
ner-city neighborhoods, surveillance and investigative equipment
and a computer terminal linked to the department's information sys-
tem. To aid in target selection, ROP routinely sought additional
information. 12
To reduce interunit rivalry that could inhibit the flow of infor-
mation needed for effective functioning, ROP commanders adopted
an internal arrest log. The log listed all arrests for which ROP of-
ficers were responsible, even if the arrest was formally booked to
another officer. This enabled ROP to assign formal arrest credit to
other officers, gain information from them and, at the same time,
obtain recognition from their supervisors for their work.
The initial ROP design distinguished between two types of ac-
tive offenders known as "targets." "Warrant targets" were persons
already wanted on one or more warrants who could be arrested on
sight. "ROP-initiated targets" (R.I. targets) were persons believed
to be criminally active but not currently wanted. Experience quickly
led ROP to create a third category of targets called "type threes."
These were individuals whom the officers arrested in the course of
other activities.
10 Special Order 82-6, March 26, 1982.
11 The criteria for selecting ROP officers from approximately 400 applicants were
not clearly specified. In an interview, the unit commander asserted that he and the three
lieutenants chose people they personally knew to be aggressive and independent of-
ficers. Interview with Edward Spurlock, Police Captain, in Washington, D.C. (July 15,
1982).
12 Information regularly obtained from departmental sources included the daily ma-
jor violators list, the criminal histories of recent arrestees, daily crime reports from each




ROP's original criterion for selecting targets was "the belief
that the person is committing five or more Part I offenses per
week."' 13 After January 1983, when a new theft statute went into
effect, 14 "persons believed to be trafficking in stolen property" were
added to the targeting pool. This standard must be examined in
terms of both its symbolic and practical effects. To observers and
ROP officers the standard suggested that the unit should seek to
apprehend the most active twenty percent of all criminals. 15 In
practice, however, the standard failed to specify the indicators of
"the belief," provided no guidelines for the officers to assess the
relative length and seriousness of a target's criminal record, and
made no distinctions among Part I offenses. For these reasons, tar-
get selection remained discretionary, situation specific and based on
the particularistic knowledge of members of each squad.1 6
Initially, target committee members selected virtually all of the
targets. Their choices rested largely on official record information.
With encouragement from ROP commanders, squads gradually
built up informal information networks and developed their own
targets on the basis of information provided by other officers and
informants.
To apprehend a warrant target, ROP officers first had to locate
him or her. Sometimes this simply involved a "turnup" at the tar-
get's last known address. Often, however, this required the officers
to learn the target's whereabouts from relatives or acquaintances.
Arresting an ROP-initiated target required the development of evi-
dence about a specific crime in which the target had participated.
The tactics used by ROP in their pursuit of such targets included
13 Special Order 82-6, March 6, 1982. Part I offenses include homicide, rape, rob-
bery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson.
14 Theft and White Collar Crime Act of 1982, 22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 3831 (Supp.
1986).
15 Targeting criminals believed to be committing five Part I offenses per week, sug-
gests that ROP sought targets committing 250 crimes annually. According to RAND
findings, this means targeting persons who were between the 79.9th percentile (repre-
senting those committing 200 crimes annually) and the 84.5th percentile (for persons
committing 300 or more crimes annually) including fraud and forgery which are not Part
I offenses. SeeJ. CHAIKEN, M. CHAIKEN &J.P. PETsRSON, supra note 1, table A 15. Fur-
thermore, these figures probably over estimate the activity of the surveyed offenders
who were prisoners convicted of robbery and burglary, and not a representative sample
of active criminals. See C. VISCHER, The Rand Inmate Survey: A Reanalysis, in 2 CAREER
CRIMINALS AND CRIMINAL CAREERS 161 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, J. Roth & C. Vischer
eds. 1986).
16 One study of target selection by vice officers observed that tight organizational
control, systematic planning, and development of targets based on clearly articulated
goals and strategies was very rare. Rather, informally understood "working bases"
guided the officers' choices. See P. MANNING, supra note 5, at 97.
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"buy and bust," 17 cultivating informants and investigating their
"tips," surveillance of targets, and linking property believed to be
stolen with its rightful owner.' 8 In sum, ROP used various channels
of information to identify active offenders, determine if they were
currently wanted on a warrant, and if not, find a way to catch them
committing a crime or develop evidence about an earlier crime on
which they could be arrested.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
A quasi-experimental nonequivalent control group design was
used to compare the number and seriousness of the arrests made by
ROP and comparison officers, the outcomes of these arrests, and
their arrestees' criminal histories at two time periods. Time 1 (TI)
extended from April 1 through September 30, 1981 (prior to the




The officer sample included an ROP group and a nonequivalent
comparison control group. The ROP group (N=40) consisted of all
officers who were in the unit during T2 and had street assignments
in Ti. ROP officials and members assigned to clerical or dispatch-
ing duties or to specialized units during TI were excluded.19
The comparison sample included several groups of officers all
of whom had the same assignment in TI and T2: (1) a random sam-
ple of fifty-three patrol officers, thirty-five district detectives and
17 A "buy and bust" strategy involves an undercover police officer or informant
purchasing a drug from a seller. The purchase is immediately followed by an arrest of
the seller without delay or concern for concealing the identity of the purchaser.
18 For a more complete discussion of targeting and apprehension activities, see S.
Martin, Catching Career Criminals: A Study of the Repeat Offender Project (Technical
Report to the National Institute of Justice 1986).
19 There were twenty-six additional officers who had been in ROP but left that unit
prior to April 1, 1983. Data were also collected on these ROP dropouts and their ar-
restees to see if the officers that remained in ROP during the study differed significantly
from officers that left the unit. When no difference was found between the two groups
of ROP officers and their arrest activities at TI, the dropouts were excluded from subse-
quent analyses. T-tests comparing differences of means between the ROP experi-
mentals and dropouts found no differences between them with respect to age (t=.447,
n.s.), length of service (t=.138, n.s.), race (t=.079, n.s.), and sex (t=.757, n.s.). Nor did
the groups differ substantially in their 1981 arrest rates. The ROP experimental officers
made a mean of 14.48 total arrests, the dropouts a mean of 13.1 (t= 1.02, n.s.). In
addition, informal interviews with ROP personnel confirmed these findings. ROP drop-
outs were a cross section of the unit's officers, they left for a variety of reasons.
1164 [Vol. 77
POLICING CAREER CRIMINALS
seven vice officers all of whom who were sworn in prior to April 1,
1979;2o (2) all sixty casual-clothes tactical officers in that assignment
at both time periods; and (3) all fourteen officers in the Special Op-
erations Division's warrant squad in both time periods.
The random sample of patrol, detective and vice officers was
selected in several steps. Five hundred names were randomly drawn
from a list of all sworn officers assigned to the Patrol Division's
seven districts as ofJune 30, 1983. All officers sworn in after April
1, 1979, and those who had changed district, division, or rank after
April 1, 1981, were eliminated. For those remaining in the sample,
the administrative officer in each district was consulted to determine
whether the officer's specific assignment at T1 and T2 was the same
and whether it offered the opportunity to arrest adult offenders. All
officers who had changed assignments and those assigned to com-
munity services, crime scene search, canine, administration, traffic,
and station clerk duties were eliminated. The first sixty patrol of-
ficers and all detectives, vice and tactical officers were selected.
21
The small size of the tactical officer sample led to the decision to
include the population of eligible tactical officers.
Arrestee Population
The arrestee population included each person arrested by an
ROP officer or comparison officer in either TI or T2. Information
on each adult arrest was collected from official arrest logs kept at
each district station. If an arrestee faced multiple charges, the arrest
was included if the officer in the sample was credited for any charge.
For each arrest the most serious arrest charge was recorded. 22 In
addition to the 228 official ROP arrests recorded in the Special Op-
erations Division's arrest book in 1983, data were collected on the
seventy arrests recorded in the ROP internal log.
The total arrestee population during TI included 579 persons
arrested by ROP officers and 1,908 arrested by the comparison of-
20 All ROP officers were sworn in prior to this date. Rookies were deleted from the
comparison sample in order to eliminate the effect of a lack of police experience as an
explanation for any observed differences in arrest behavior.
21 After collecting data on arrests made by these patrol officers, it became evident
that seven of them had either changed assignment or had been on extended sick leave.
When these observations were confirmed by the administrative officers, these officers
were eliminated from the sample, but they were not replaced.
22 In recording the most serious charge, the coders used the following ranking sys-
tem: Part I offenses according to the Uniform Crime Report ranking; Part II offenses
against a person; any weapon offense; any drug offense; any other property offense;




ficers; during T2, 298 ROP arrestees and 2,078 comparison
arrestees.
For the analyses of ROP and comparison case dispositions and
the arrestees' prior arrest histories, computer-generated random
samples of about 300 ROP-81, comparison-81, and comparison-83
arrestees were drawn to compare with all ROP-83 arrestees.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Data
Data were obtained from the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department on the date of birth, length of police service, sex
and race of each officer in the study. The department also provided
arrest records for the approximately 1,200 arrestees in the sample.
From the police arrest logs each adult arrestee's name, date of birth,
race, social security number, date of arrest, total number of charges
and most serious arrest charge was obtained. Prosecution, disposi-
tion, and sentence data were collected from the public records of
the Criminal Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court
and the United States District Court.
These data were used in three separate analyses that examined
arrestees' prior criminal history, their case dispositions and
sentences, and the officers' arrest productivity.
Criminal History Analysis
The criminal history analysis was designed to determine
whether ROP officers were more likely to select and arrest repeat
offenders (i.e., persons with long prior arrest records for serious
crimes) than they had been in their previous assignment or than the
comparison officers. Ten measures of prior record were used: the
total number of prior arrests, the total number of prior Part I ar-
rests, the number of arrests for each of the principal Part I of-
fenses, 23 and Part I arrests during the five years prior to the end of
the study period (September 30, 1981 or 1983). Because the mean
age of the ROP-83 arrestees was higher than that of the three other
groups, the analyses of arrest history were statistically adjusted for
arrestee's age.24 The statistical tests used to compare the arrest his-
23 See supra note 13.
24 The ROP-83 arrestees' mean age was 30.9; the mean ages of ROP-81, comparison-
81 and comparison-83 were 28.5, 28.2 and 28.4 respectively. Thus, the adjustment for
age was employed to reduce bias arising from differences among the groups in vulnera-
bility to an adult arrest. To illustrate, a nineteen year old has had only a one year win-
dow of vulnerability; a twenty-nine year old has had ten additional years to accumulate a
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tories of the arrestees of each officer group at T1 and T2 included
one way analysis of variance, simultaneous tests of significance of
pairs of means and regression. Since the findings of these analyses
were similar, only the regression results are reported here.
Disposition Analysis
A variety of factors have been found by reseachers to affect case
disposition and sentencing. These include the seriousness of the
arrest and prosecution charges, the length and seriousness of the
arrestee's prior criminal history, the arrestee's age and the strength
of the evidence available in the case.25 The study's disposition anal-
ysis sought to determine: (1) whether the arrests produced by ROP
differed from those of the comparison groups; (2) whether this led
to higher rates of prosecution, conviction and incarceration of re-
peat offenders and; (3) if so, to what factor or combination of factors
this finding could be attributed.
ROP and comparison officers' cases were first analyzed with re-
spect to the types of arrest and prosecution charges. The strength
of evidence was then computed indirectly as the remaining differ-
ences in case dispositions after statistically controlling for the effects
of the arrestees' age and prior arrest records. To explore the sepa-
rate and joint effects of the disposition of the prosecuted case, incar-
ceration given conviction, and sentence length given an
incarcerative sentence, each variable was regressed on the arresting
officer group (coded as a dummy variable with comparison-83 as the
suppressed category). Each full model included charge type, arrest-
ing officer's assignment, arrestee's age, and his or her prior arrest
history. Crime type and officer assignment were also coded as
dummy variables with property crimes and SOD warrant squad as
the suppressed categories. The sentence length model was run
twice; first using the normal form then with a logarithmic transfor-
mation of the dependent variable to reduce the effect of extremely
long sentences. 26
lengthy arrest record. Since the ROP-83 arrestees tended to be older, the adjustment
provided a more conservative measure of their criminal activity.
25 For a review of the literature on the determinants of sentencing, see RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 83 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S. Martin, & M.
Tonry eds. 1983).
26 The regression was run using ordinary least squares (OLS) rather than the techni-
cally more correct logit for two reasons. First, interpretation of the data is much more
straightforward. Second, where the dependent variable is within a seventy-five to
twenty-five percent split, there is little difference in outcome. See A. GOLDBERGER,
ECONOMETRIC THEORY 201 (1964).
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Officer Arrest Productivity Analysis
The officer productivity analysis was designed to look at the ef-
fect of assignment to ROP on officers' arrest productivity using
three different outcome measures: total arrests including violations
of municipal ordinances and traffic laws; "serious" arrests; and Part
I arrests. "Serious" arrests includes all Part I offenses as well as
arrests for weapons offenses, drug distribution or possession with
the intent to distribute, and arrests on a felony bench warrant.
27
Changes in the individual arrest rates of each ROP and compar-
ison officer were examined using two different measures for ROP
arrests and by statistically controlling for differences related to dis-
trict, assignment, time in ROP, and the 1981 productivity arrest.
28
Six models were developed to examine each of the three arrest
measures. Model 1 included all ROP officers without adjusting
either for the number of weeks in ROP during T2 or for the effects
of changes in the arrest rates of a few extremely active officers. In
Models 2 through 6 various combinations of adjustments for time in
ROP and for the effects of extreme values were introduced. Twelve
of the ROP officers were in that unit less than the full twenty-six
week T2 period. To eliminate bias against ROP, which could be
related to officers' time in the ROP unit, two adjustments were in-
troduced. In Models 3 and 4, (labeled "adjusted") time in ROP was
adjusted by proportionally increasing the weight of the number of
arrests made by ROP officers who were in the unit less than twenty-
six weeks. In Models 5 and 6, (labeled "partial") time in ROP was
adjusted by eliminating from the analysis the five ROP officers who
were in the unit for less than thirteen weeks during the study period.
To adjust for the effects on the entire sample of extreme changes in
individual arrest rates, in Models 2, 4 and 6 a logarithmic transfor-
mation of the dependent variable was used.29
27 These three overlapping arrest categories provided a more comprehensive mea-
sure of the nature of officers' arrests than any single meassure. The "serious" category
was developed to include the "quality" arrests that are frequently made by vice officers
(i.e., drug distribution or possession with intent to distribute), those made by warrant
squad and ROP (i.e., felony bench warrant arrests) where the charge was usually a Part I
offense, and those regarded by police officers as serious (i.e., weapons offenses).
28 Examination of ROP and comparison officers' demographic characteristics indi-
cated that they did not differ in racial composition, but that ROP officers were signifi-
cantly younger (ROP X=32.6; comparison X=34.8, t=-3.22 p<.01), less experienced
(ROP years of police service X=9.22; comparison X=11.58, t=-4.47 p<.001), and more
often female (ROP X= 1.15; comparison X= 1.02, t=2.05 p<.05) than the comparison
officers. To control for the possible effects of these differences on arrest productivity
each officers' 1981 arrest rate was included in'the regression equation. This means that
the 1983 arrest activity measure was a change score variable.
29 Regression analysis assumes that the underlying relationships among variables are
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Each model was run twice using different measures of ROP-83
arrests. The first measure, total arrests, included both those offi-
cially credited to the unit as recorded in departmental arrests books
as well as the unofficial arrests recorded in the internal log main-
tained by the ROP unit. The unofficial arrests included those that
ROP officers brought about but did not actually make (e.g., they
convinced someone to turn himself in), those they "gave" to an-
other assisting officer, and those arrests they participated in that oc-
curred outside Washington, D.C. The second measure, official
arrests, included only arrests formally credited to ROP officers in
the departmental arrest book.
Use of either the official or total arrest measure involved intro-
ducing contrasting biases. Because ROP officers were strongly en-
couraged to formally credit arrests to others and to cooperate with
other officers in both the District of Columbia and neighboring po-
lice departments, the official arrest measure systematically under-
represented ROP officers' arrest productivity. The total arrest
measure, on the other hand, inflated ROP officers' arrest rates rela-
tive to those of comparison officers who may have contributed to
others' arrests but got no such informal recognition for doing so.
To be conservative, the data subsequently presented in Table 7 and
the accompanying text (except as otherwise noted) are based on the
official arrest measure which understates to an unknown degree
ROP officers' true arrest productivity.
III. FINDINGS
PRIOR ARREST HISTORY
Comparison of the mean number of prior arrests of ROP of-
ficers' 1983 arrestees with the mean number of prior arrests of their
arrestees in 1981 and with the mean number of prior arrests of com-
parison officer arrestees in both years (after adjusting each for age)
indicated that ROP-83 arrestees had substantially longer and more
serious prior arrest records than the arrestees in the other three
both linear and additive. In certain instances when this is not the case and a single linear
model is inadequate, a transformation of the original variables may permit the resultant
relations among the transformed variables to become linear. One type of nonlinearity,
which arises when a few extreme values affect the outcome, can be overcome by using a
logarithmic transformation. The model then becomes y=a+blogX=a+bz. Each X
score is transformed into a new variable, Z, which is the log. Such transformations are
particularly useful where an independent variable, X, takes a wide range of values but
once a certain value is reached further increases or decreases have less and less effect on
the dependent variable. Thus, a logarithmic transformation reduces the effect of ex-
treme values on the overall outcome. See H. BLA.ocx, SocaL. STAnsTics 312 (1960).
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groups. For example, in 1981 both ROP and comparison arrestees
had an adjusted mean of 5.9 total prior arrests. In 1983, the ROP
arrestees' adjusted mean rose to 6.4, whereas the 1983 comparison
group arrestees' adjusted mean dropped to 4.9. This difference was
statistically significant (p < .01).
TABLE 1
REGRESSION OF ARRESTEE'S PRIOR ARREST HISTORY ON
OFFICER GROUP AND AGE
STANDARD
b ERROR OF b t p
2
TOTAL ARRESTS .10
ROP-81 1.04 .573 1.83
Comparison-81 .98 .575 1.70
ROP-83 1.62 .594 2.73**
Age .25 .025 10.00**
Intercept -2.35
TOTAL PART I'S .04
ROP-81 .38 .267 1.42
Comparison-81 .62 .267 2.32*
ROP-83 .78 .276 2.83**
Age .17 .012 14.17**
Intercept - .22
ROBBERY .01
ROP-81 .081 .092 .88
Comparison-81 .153 .093 1.65
ROP-83 .264 .096 2.75**
Age .004 .004 1.00
Intercept .253
PART I ARREST IN
PAST 5 YEARS .02
ROP-81 .131 .132 .99
Comparison-81 .392 .132 2.97**
ROP-83 .369 .137 2.69**
Age .014 .005 2.80**
Intercept 1.320
# Standard error of the b coefficient
* Significant < .05
* * Significant < .01
Differences between ROP arrestees' prior criminal histories and
those of the other three groups were also examined by regressing
total, Part I, and each offense type on officer group (coded as a
dummy variable with comparison-83 as the suppressed category)
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and arrestee age. As shown in Table 1, after statistically removing
the effect of age by including it in the regression model, ROP-83
arrestees had significantly more total prior arrests, prior Part I ar-
rests, robbery arrests, and Part I arrests in the previous five years
than the comparison-83 group arrestees. Age was also significantly
associated with total, Part I and Part I arrests in the previous five
years.
CASE DISPOSrrIONS
The type of offenses for which ROP and comparison officers
made arrests were very similar in 1981 except that the comparison
group made more "fugitive, etc." arrests (seven percent vs. one per-
cent of their respective total arrests) and fewer "other" arrests
(twenty-four percent vs. thirty-five percent) as shown in Table 2. In
TABLE 2
ARREST OFFENSE TYPE BY OFFICER GROUP
PERCENT ARRESTED ROP-81 COMPARISON-81 ROP-83 COMPARISON-83
FOR OFFENSE TYPE (N=308) (N=300) (N=261) (N=308)
Violent Part 1 12 12 12 9
Simple Assault 3 3 1 2
Nonviolent Part I 15 20 12 13
Nonviolent Part II 4 4 6 4
Weapon 3 3 3 4
Drug Dealing and
Possession with
Intent to Distribute 4 2 3 4
Drug Possession 18 17 13 16
D.C. Case on Bench
Warrant* 5 8 8 11
Fugitive, Escape,
Parole or Probation
Violation 1 7 26 8
Other** 35 24 15 30
Total 100% 100% 99% 100%
* Failure to appear at any point in the processing of a criminal case led to the
issuance of a bench warrant for the rearrest of the accused.
** Includes sexual solicitation, operating a lottery (gambling), disorderly conduct,
unlawful entry, violation of vending regulations and all traffic offenses.
1983, they were also quite similar except in these same two catego-
ries. In 1983, the proportion of ROP arrests for fugitive, escape,
probation and parole violations rose to twenty-six percent of all ar-
rests while the proportion of "fugitive etc." comparison arrests was
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only eight percent. The proportion of "other" arrests fell to fifteen
percent while thirty percent of comparison officers' arrests were in
the "other" category.
Most arrests in both the "fugitive etc." and "other" categories
are not presented for prosecution in the District of Columbia courts
and, therefore, do not appear in the subsequent disposition analy-
ses. However, they differ markedly in seriousness. The offense un-
derlying a fugitive arrest is almost always a felony. Probation and
parole violations often result in incarceration. "Other" offenses, in
contrast, involve predominantly minor misdemeanors for which the
arrestee, in essence, pays a fine.30 Thus, overall ROP-83 arrests
tended to be for more serious crimes than comparison arrests.
TABLE 3
INITIAL PROSECUTION DECISION BY OFFICER GROUP
PROSECUTORIAL ROP-81 COMPARISON-81 ROP-83 COMPARISON-83
DECISION N % N % N % N %
Charged as a
Felony 50 25 54 28 67 44 39 21
Charged as a
Misdemeanor 103 52 83 44 48 31 83 45
Previously Charged
Bench Warrant 13 7 25 13 17 11 30 16
Not Charged 31 16 28 15 21 14 32 17




Differences in the initial prosecutorial treatment of 1983 ROP
and comparison officers' District of Columbia arrests on original
charges also suggest that those arrests made by ROP officers were
for more serious offenses than those of comparison officers. Table
3 shows that the proportion of ROP and comparison arrests prose-
cuted as felonies was similar in 1981. In 1983, however, forty-four
percent of the ROP arrests but only twenty-one percent of the com-
parison arrests were charged as new felony cases.
Table 4 showing case dispositions indicates that two changes
appear to have occurred between 1981 and 1983. First, there was a
30 Persons charged with driving without a license, disorderly conduct, and vending
regulation violations may simply elect to forfeit the collateral they post at the police
station. The few "other" arrests resulting in cases presented for prosecution included




DISPOSITIONS OF PROSECUTED CASES BY OFFICER GROUP
PERCENT OF ROP-81 CoMPARIsoN-81 ROP-83 CoMPARIsoN-83
DIsPosrrIoN (N= 166) (N= 162) (N= 132) (N= 139)
Felony Conviction 19 21 24 16
Misdemeanor
Conviction 30 32 38 47
Total Conviction 49 49 63* 63
Nolle, Dismiss,
Acquit 51 51 37 37




* Felony and misdemeanor convictions do not total 63% due to rounding.
general increase in the conviction rate from forty-nine to sixty-three
percent of all cases for both ROP and comparison groups. Second,
there was a separate ROP effect as the officers in that unit increased
the proportion of their cases resulting in felony convictions from
nineteen to twenty-four percent while comparison officers' felony
convictions fell from twenty-one to sixteen percent of their
dispositions.
The findings on incarceration rates and sentence lengths must
be interpreted cautiously because eighteen ROP and thirteen com-
parison cases were still pending on December 31, 1984, (the end of
data collection) and most of these involved serious felonies likely to
result in incarceration, provided the arrestee was convicted. Never-
theless, the proportion of convicted ROP arrestees sentenced to in-
carceration in 1983 (forty percent) was essentially the same as the
proportion of arrestees in both groups sentenced to serve time in
1981 (forty-one percent for ROP-81 and forty-two percent for com-
parison-81) while the comparison-83 incarceration rate fell to thirty-
two percent.
The regression of incarceration on officer group, conviction of-
fense type, convictee's prior arrest history and age, as shown in Ta-
ble 5 indicates that there were no significant differences among the
officer groups after the effects of the offender's prior criminal his-
tory were removed. However, the number of prior arrests was sig-
nificantly associated with the likelihood of incarceration. This
suggests an explanation for the absence of a change in ROP-83 and
11731986]
SUSAN E. MARTIN
the decrease in comparison-83 incarceration rates. Growing over-
crowding at local prisons and jails led to more conservative sentenc-
ing and a general decrease in incarceration rates, but because ROP
arrestees had longer and more serious prior arrest records than
comparison arrestees, their incarceration rates remained at the 1981
level.
TABLE 5
REGRESSION OF INCARCERATION DECISION ON OFFICER GROUP,
AGE, PRIOR ARREST HISTORY AND OFFENSE TYPE
STANDARD
b ERROR OF b t
ROP-81 .009 .093 .10
Comparison-81 .123 .086 1.43
ROP-83 .133 .129 1.03
Total Prior Arrests# .017 .004 4.25**
Age .073 .013 5.62**
Violent .159 .091 1.74*
Weapon .037 .152 .24
Narcotic -. 082 .091 .90
Bench Warrant .216 .101 2.14*
Other Offense -. 065 .167 .39
Patrol .099 .138 .72
Tact .111 .119 .93
Vice .059 .183 .32
Detective -. 108 .162 .66
Intercept .041
R 2 = .148
F = 3.58
DF = 1,206
# The regression was run twice. First it included total prior arrests, then
it used prior Part I arrests. Each measure of prior record was
significant, but the other findings were unaffected.
* Significant < .05
** Significant < .01
The regression of sentence length on arresting officer group,
with prior arrest history, offender age, and conviction offense in-
cluded in the model, showed that ROP-83 cases did not significantly
differ from those of the other groups using the normal form. When
a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable was used,
however, ROP-83 sentences were found to be significantly longer,
as shown in Table 6. This finding suggests that ROP had an in-
dependent impact on the length of sentence apart from the effects
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of offense type and offender's age. This is particularly notable in
light of the large number of ROP cases still pending.
TABLE 6
REGRESSION OF LOG-TRANSFORMED SENTENCE LENGTH ON
OFFICER GROUP, AGE, PRIOR ARREST HISTORY AND
CONVICTION OFFENSE TYPE*
STANDARD
VARIABLE b ERROR OF b t
ROP-81 .445 .468 .95
Comparison-81 .101 .464 .29
ROP-83 1.073 .491 2.19*
Total Prior Arrests .003 .017 .18
Age .064 .024 2.66**
Violent 1.380 .452 3.05**
Weapon .570 .779 .73
Narcotic .108 .540 .20
Bench Warrant .157 .464 .34





* Significant < .05 level.
** Significant < .01 level.
There are two explanations for this ROP effect on sentences.
First, stronger evidence in ROP cases may have enabled prosecutors
to negotiate for longer prison terms. Second, differences between
the seriousness of ROP and comparison conviction offenses within
each of the broad offense type categories used may have contributed
to differences in sentence lengths.
OFFICER ARREST PRODUCTIVITY
The third component of the study focused on the impact of as-
signment to ROP on its officers' arrest productivity. The results,
shown in Table 7, are based on the ROP official arrest measure.
The top row indicates that across all six models assignment to ROP
significantly reduced individual officers' total 1983 arrest rates.
None of the adjustments altered the significance of this finding.
ROP membership also significantly depressed official Part I arrests
across all models, as shown in the second row of Table 7. The third
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TABLE 7
REGRESSION OF OFFICIAL 1983 ARREST RATES ON OFFICER GROUP,
1981 ARREST RATES, DISTRIcT AND ASSIGNMENT t
ALL ARRESTS
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6
(UNG) (ULC) (ANG) (ALC) (UNP) (ULP)
81 Arrest .497" # #  .374'" .494" .373"" .499" .361
Rate # #  .460 .380 .457 .406 .381 .371
(.064) .061 (.065) (.061) (.066) .062
ROP Exp. -7.235"" -. 453- -6.77"" -. 366"" -7.47"" -. 371"
-. 217 -. 185 -. 203 -. 151 -. 212 -. 146
(1.79) (.134) (1.79) (.134) (1.92) (.143)
Constant 7.22 1.27 7.21 1.27 7.27 1.32
Adj. R. .46 .47 .45 .43 .45 .42
PART I ARRESTS
81 Arrest .260"" .269"" .258"" .267"" .260"" .270"
Rate# #  .356 .305 .354 .302 .357 .307
(.049) (.059) (.049) (.059) (.050) (.060)
ROP Exp. -. 962"* -. 303"" -. 910" -. 281"" -. 903"" -. 255""
-. 178 -. 175 -. 168 -. 162 -. 158 -. 141
(.348) (.111) (.349) (.112) (.374) (.119)
Constant 1.73 .680 1.74 .683 1.71 .666
Adj. R. .21 .21 .21 .20 .20 .19
"SERIOUS" ARRESTS
81 Arrest .307"" .260" .303"' .254"" .307"" .263"
Rate## .273 .266 .269 .259 .272 .270
(.065) .063 (.065) (.064) (.065) .063
ROP Exp. -. 113"* .064 .093 .109 .081 .151
-. 009 .030 .008 .052 .006 .069
(.069) (.122) (.614) .123 (.652) (.128)
Constant 1.65 .682 1.65 .690 1.60 .658
Adj. R. .53 .35 .53 .34 .53 .35
District and assignment, which were included in all models, are not shown in the
table. Data for the full model are available from the author.
# In the models, U=unadjusted for time; A=adjusted for time by weighting;
N=normal; L=logged form; C=complete sample; P=partial with five ROP
officers in the less than 13 weeks deleted.
## Upper coefficient is unstandardized regression coefficient; middle is standardized
form (Beta); standard error is in parenthesis.
Significant < .05 level.
Significant < .01 level.
row of the table shows that in all but the unadjusted model, ROP
had no effect on its officers' official "serious" arrest rates.
When the analyses were rerun using total ROP arrests rather
than official arrests, however, the depressive effect on Part I arrests
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disappeared in all of the models and a significant positive ROP ef-
fect appeared in all but the unadjusted model. This suggests an
ROP effect across the ROP officer population. Since there was no
increase in the rate of Part I arrests, the increase in "serious" ar-
rests, which included Part I's, is attributable to more arrests for the
other crimes in the "serious" category.
Because of the biases inherent in each of the measures of ROP
1983 arrests, the "true" effect of ROP on its officers' Part I and "se-
rious" arrest productivity remains unclear. The data suggest that
ROP officers tended to make fewer Part I and more "serious" ar-
rests in 1983 than they had in 1981. However, the magnitude of
these changes relative to changes in comparison officers' arrest rates
in 1983 remains in doubt.
IV. DISCUSSION
The foregoing examination of the effect of the Repeat Offender
Project's proactive perpetrator-oriented crime control strategy on
three aspects of officers' arrest-related behavior suggests that ROP
has achieved most of its goals. First, it has significantly increased
the seriousness of the criminal histories of its officers' arrestees.
Second, it has altered the nature and outcomes of ROP officers' ar-
rests in several ways. It has directly increased the seriousness of the
instant arrest charge made by its officers and the likelihood of the
case being prosecuted and the offender convicted of a felony. ROP
also has indirectly led to increases in incarceration rates and sen-
tence lengths for offenders arrested by ROP officers. These appear
to be the result of the more extensive criminal histories and more
serious instant arrest offenses of the individuals arrested by ROP
officers. At the same time, ROP has affected its officers' arrest pro-
ductivity. ROP has significantly reduced its officers' total number of
arrests and probably their Part I arrests while having no effect (to be
conservative) or increasing (using the more inclusive measure) the
number of their "serious" arrests. These findings suggest two areas
for further discussion: first, an explanation of the changes in officer
behavior; second, an examination of the policy implications of these
charges for police departments.
EXPLANATION OF CHANGES IN ROP OFFICERS' BEHAVIOR
The magnitude of the changes in officers' arrest productivity,
the nature of their arrests, and the criminal histories of their ar-
restees all suggest that the differences between ROP and compari-
son officers in 1983 was the result of an organizational effect rather
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than initial differences among the officers. By altering the nature
and organization of the officers' work activities and the norms and
goals of the unit in which they work, ROP produced a change in the
officers' behavior. From the outset, ROP's command staff made
clear that the officers were expected to make "quality" arrests of
active repeat offenders by concentrating on investigation and sur-
veillance of pre-selected targets. The officers were discouraged
from making arrests for traffic violations, disorderly conduct, or
other misdemeanors which had constituted more than one third of
their arrests in 1981. The ROP officers' supervisors indicated their
disapproval of minor arrests by excluding them from ROP's bi-
weekly report to the Chief. Other ROP officers teased those who
made such arrests about "lowering ROP standards." Consequently,
such arrests were greatly reduced.
Changes in officer arrest behavior also stemmed from changes
in the organization and nature of the officers' work. Rather than
working alone or in pairs, ROP officers worked in five to seven per-
son squads which were assigned targets and given credit for arrests.
The officers spent more time on fewer activities than they had in
their previous assignments. The ROP officers proactively selected
targets on the basis of a variety of indicators, in contrast with their
former practice of reactively arresting individuals whom they en-
countered violating the law.
The decrease in ROP officers' rates of Part I arrests and possi-
ble increase in arrest rates for "serious" crimes can also be ex-
plained by the ROP unit's targeting and apprehension strategies.
These, in turn, were influenced by internal and broader environ-
mental pressures. Initially surveillance was the principal strategy
that was used by the ROP squads in their efforts to apprehend
targets. Surveillance efforts were supposed to occupy half of the of-
ficers' time and energy. Faced with few arrests of R.I. targets and
growing officer frustration, ROP personnel made several adapta-
tions to increase the unit's productivity.
First, the officers increased the proportion of warrant targets
and, within this target category, increasingly selected persons
wanted on one or more felony bench warrants. 31 Warrant targets
were preferred because they tended to take less time and effort and
required less investigation than R.I. targets. ROP officers found it
31 A bench warrant is issued by the District of Columbia Superior Court when a per-
son fails to appear for a court date, is charged with a violation of probation or parole, or




far easier to arrest a person wanted on an outstanding warrant for
robbery than to catch him or her "in the act."
The ROP officers specifically selected warrant targets wanted
on bench warrants for several reasons. First, there was less competi-
tion with other District of Columbia officers who might also be
searching for such persons. Second, parole and probation violators
were less likely than other warrant targets to be released on bail.
Third, the ROP officers were often provided with information on
the whereabouts of the target by parole or probation officers and by
officers in neighboring jurisdictions which facilitated the search.
Fourth, arrests of fugitives involved little paperwork, and led to tri-
als in courts believed to give tougher sentences than the District of
Columbia Superior Court. As Table 2 indicates, persons arrested
on bench warrants accounted for more than one third of all ROP
arrests. An examination of ROP's internal records indicated that
most bench warrant arrests actually involved an underlying Part I
offense.
The second adaptation that affected the number and nature of
ROP officers' arrests was a policy of arresting an ROP-initiated tar-
get on any legally appropriate charge rather than waiting for a Part I
arrest. The officers targeted persons believed to be high rate Part I
offenders but arrested them for other crimes for which it is easier to
make an arrest. Because a high proportion of very active offenders
are drug addicts and support their habits by dealing, stealing, or
both,3 2 and many are armed, ROP officers found it far easier to ap-
prehend such individuals for possession of contraband (i.e., a gun,
drugs, or stolen property) than to observe and arrest them commit-
ting a Part I crime.
ROP's policy of aggressively cultivating informants, following
up "hot tips" provided by a variety of sources, and using its officers
in undercover operations also led to an emphasis on "serious" and
Part II property crimes. There is an organized market for illicit
goods in which informants were often participants. Thus, the ROP
informants were more likely to know about the crimes of other
criminals participating in this market than the less organized, violent
Part I offenses. The illicit market also enabled ROP to use under-
cover "infiltration" tactics to penetrate organized theft and fencing
activities. Several squads became involved in investigations of ROP-
initiated targets that took several months before they resulted in the
recovery of large amounts of stolen property and the arrests of a few
32 SeeJ. CHAIKEN, M. CHAIKEN &J.P. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 155.
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highly active "fences," burglars, and thieves on charges of receiving
and trafficking in stolen property.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Despite ROP's apparent success in selecting, arresting, and
contributing to the incarceration of repeat offenders, several factors
suggest a cautious interpretation of the findings regarding the effec-
tiveness of a specialized proactive police unit for addressing urban
crime problems. ROP's ultimate goal was the reduction of crime
principally through the incapacitation of high rate offenders. 33 Un-
fortunately, no measure of its incapacitation effect could be devel-
oped. To measure ROP officers' incapacitation effects in the same
way that their arrest productivity was examined would have required
data on each arrestee's pretrial release status and case outcome.
Such data were unavailable within the design and budget of this
study.
In the absence of statistical estimates or self-reported data on
arrestees' individual crime rates, the arrestees' records were used as
an indicator of their criminal activity. Such a measure has serious
limitations. RAND studies of self-reported criminal activities found
that on the average, individual offense rates were higher for persons
with more extensive arrest histories than shorter ones.3 4 But these
studies also found that prediction models based on arrest history
alone often failed to distinguish between high rate and low rate indi-
vidual offenders. ROP arrestees were found to have longer prior
records than comparison arrestees. Furthermore, the "street" in-
formation on which ROP officers relied heavily in selecting targets
probably led to a more accurate selection of criminally active targets
than reliance on criminal history alone. Nevertheless, it is impossi-
ble to determine how often ROP officers selected targets that were
among the most active twenty percent of all offenders, which was
their goal. Other factors suggest that some ROP targets did not
meet the targeting criteria. When faced with pressures to "put some
meat on the table" and to nurture sources of information by doing
favors for other officers, ROP officers stretched target selection cri-
teria. ROP's targets tended to be mature adults (the mean age of its
arrestees was 30.9) although several studies have found that crimi-
nal activity diminishes with age. Thus, some ROP targets may have
been "burned out" criminals. Reliance on District of Columbia
33 See supra note 2.
34 See P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, supra note 1, at 37; J. CHAIKEN, M. CHAIKEN &




criminal history data rather than complete FBI records also presents
a limited picture of the arrestees' criminal histories. For these rea-
sons, the findings regarding ROP targets' criminality must be re-
garded as suggestive.
In assessing ROP's effectiveness one must also consider its
costs. In addition to the approximately $60,000 capital investment
in the unit, the assignment of officers to ROP reduced their arrest
productivity. The arrests forgone, however, were mostly for traffic
infractions and public order offenses. Thus, the trade off appears to
be a reduction in order maintenance and service activities in ex-
change for an increased focus on crime reduction efforts.
ROP officers' extensive discretion, their use of undercover tac-
tics and reliance on informants provides them with substantial op-
portunities to harass, entrap, and otherwise violate citizens' rights.
To date, ROP has avoided lawsuits, major complaints of harass-
ment, the use of firearms and due process violations by emphasizing
careful attention to legality. Nevertheless, the potential dangers to
civil liberties that units such as ROP pose must be considered by
departments planning to establish similar proactive units. Clearly
specified, written target selection criteria and administrative control
mechanisms over targeting and apprehension activities are neces-
sary to limit potential abuses of discretion and to reduce the danger
that informants rather than the organization will shape targeting
priorities.
Satisfactorily balancing warrant and unit-initiated targets poses
a difficult policy choice that should be addressed explicitly. Warrant
targets on the average take less time and officer effort to apprehend
and can be selected to focus on persons wanted for violent offenses.
Because of their wanted status, the apprehension of warrant targets
poses less of a threat to civil liberties than arrests of unit-initiated
targets. The latter, on the other hand, constitute the unique proac-
tive aspect of such a unit's operation. The unit-initiated targets tend
to be persons who are involved in organized property crime and
thus, promise greater payoffs in terms of information about a net-
work of criminal activities. The mix of warrant and unit-initiated
targets should be affected by the backlog of wanted persons in the
jurisdiction and by the relative magnitude of the jurisdiction's
problems with violent and property crime.
One must be cautious in generalizing the findings of this case
study. What "worked" for ROP may be related to the particular
characteristics of Washington, D.C., its police department, or the
personnel and leadership of ROP which may not be present if ROP
is replicated elsewhere. ROP's newness and visibility also may have
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contributed to a "we try harder" spirit in the unit that is likely to
diminish with routinization.
This study has left a number of questions unanswered. Further
research is needed, for example, on ROP's target selection proce-
dures and its crime control effects. Nevertheless, this study's find-
ings provide some encouragement for police to develop an offender
oriented, proactive strategy to supplement reactive police tactics in
the effort to catch career criminals.
